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Introduction
A nuclear reprocessing facility may be an excellent idea in terms of reducing waste
entering the environment, but there is one major concern that keeps fuel reprocessing from
becoming widely accepted. Public fear of proliferation has stunted the growth of interest in
reprocessing. In developing and running a large-scale reprocessing facility, the complication is
whether or not it can be built such that weapons-usable material (WUM) is properly accounted
for at all stages from arrival to delivery. Despite all the current technology and safeguarding,
determination of the limitations within reprocessing facilities in order to understand the risks
involved is still a challenge.
This thesis explores such possible weaknesses by focusing on an aqueous reprocessing
facility as the site for WUM diversion. The following sections describe the layout of a
hypothetical aqueous reprocessing facility, safeguards requirements, surveillance systems,
detection systems, chemical processes and their associated mechanical systems, and some
potential methods for diversion. Given that the focus is on aqueous reprocessing, the main
question is, "What is the facility's proliferation success tree structure?" This thesis analyzes
attractive diversion scenarios for an aqueous fuel reprocessing facility using a success tree
format.
This study focuses on the various approaches and the ease of proliferation from the
facility operator's point of view. In other words, the facility operators themselves are the
proliferators trying to defeat safeguards imposed by external organizations. The success of
diversion is dependent on the probability of successfully defeating the various preventive
measures considering that there may be multiple attempts or pathways taken without getting
caught. For the purpose of this study, a success tree is used to compare different diversion
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approaches. The overall study of attractive diversion scenarios for aqueous reprocessing
facilities will determine the feasibility to divert material and hopefully prompts design
reconsiderations that can target any current weaknesses.
1 Reprocessing Facility General Description
The focus of this study involves analyzing key information relevant to diverting material
from a nuclear reprocessing facility. Because this information is sensitive material, reprocessing
facilities do not make available complete and detailed descriptions of the facility. However,
there is a general trend for how nuclear facilities are laid out and procedures for entering and
exiting the facility. In the following sections, a fictitious reprocessing facility is crafted based on
various sources describing real nuclear facilities. Referenced sources include published literature,
pictures, videos, and personal tours of existing nuclear facilities. The crafting of such kind of
fictional reprocessing facility is done in order to study potential diversion scenarios, which are
discussed in later chapters.
1.1 General Description
The reprocessing facility consists of three major buildings (see Figure 1-1). The first is
the main administrative building. The second is the reprocessing building where the actual fuel
handling takes place. The last building is the shipment building. Entering the reprocessing
building requires going either through the administrative building or the shipment building via
underground tunnels. The reprocessing building is built as a containment building for the fuel.
When the reprocessing building was first built, the construction was overseen by IAEA
inspectors to verify that it was according to the schematics. Any changes made since the
construction were also reviewed by IAEA inspectors.
The reprocessing facility has about 10,000 employees who ensure the continual
reprocessing operation (Sellafield Ltd). This group of people handles not only the fuel
reprocessing, but everything necessary to maintain a semi-independent reprocessing facility such
as repairs, maintenance, and radiation protection. External to the facility's employees are police
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who visit throughout the day and are on call for any emergencies. Resident IAEA inspectors are
also on-site 24 hours a day and perform random inspections of the facility using their own
equipment and their own laboratory (Iwamoto, Ebata, Fujimaki, & Ai, 2006).
Reprocessing Administrative
Building Building
Underground
Shipment Tunnels
Building
Parking Lot
Figure 1-1. Reprocessing facility above shows the reprocessing building that is accessible via underground
tunnels from either the shipment building or the administrative building. This facility is also enclosed with
gates and monitored with cameras (not shown).
Personnel verification and logs are done via RFID name badges when entering secured
areas. In addition, keys to enter certain restricted areas are distributed based on training and
clearance levels. There is a key cabinet with keys to all areas accessible to the person in charge
in the main operations room.
The reprocessing facility also continuously operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with
few maintenance and major holiday shutdowns. During evening and night shifts, only minimum
staff is on-site to verify processes are functioning normally. Other personnel remain on call for
any emergencies.
1.2 Entering and Exiting Procedures
To enter the main building, an RFID name badge is required. This type of badge is
distributed to everyone from administrators to maintenance staff. After entering the building,
there are several administrative offices. The fuel reprocessing occurs in a separate building that
branches off from the main building.
The primary entrance to the reprocessing facility is from within the main building,
although there are other exits such as those for the shipment building and emergencies that are
not attached to the main building. Nonetheless, these exits are still confined within a fenced
boundary under constant video surveillance. In order to enter the restricted area, an RFID name
badge is required. This badge is obtained by undergoing radiation training and a thorough
background check. The name badge is only used to enter the restricted area, and keys must be
used to enter any further restricted areas within the reprocessing facility.
There is a video documenting a tour of the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP)
that goes through the entering process. The tour first enters a locker room where one removes
shoes and socks and proceeds to put on special socks. Then, each individual passes through a
turnstile and enters a shoe room. The setup of the facility entrance is similar to that shown in
Figure 1-2. Everyone puts on a clean lab coat upon entering the shoe room and proceeds to a
bench as directed. The shoe room is divided by a bench that cuts through the room to separate
the clean area from the potentially contaminated area. Under the bench facing the unclean area
are cubbyholes for storing shoes used in the potentially contaminated area. Shoes are put on by
taking shoes out of the cubbyhole and swinging over the bench into them while avoiding
stepping on the clean side of the bench. Everyone then signs in to enter the facility. To exit the
facility, the entry procedure is reversed with a few additions such as frisking for contamination
prior to exiting (sinema7, 2007). Detectors for this can include whole body detectors integrated
into a turnstile like mechanism that allows only one person through at a time.
Figure 1-2. Man is entering the reprocessing building. Camera records the man entering while the turnstile
has a weight that records his entering mass. RFID sensor grants access after successfully verifying identity
via RFID.
In a personal tour of a power plant in Japan, a nearly full set of clothing was provided.
This included a full body suit and a hardhat in addition to the socks and shoes, all of which were
nearly identical to those worn by personnel except for the visitor tags and color coding. These
were all returned to the facility at the end of the tour after frisking for contamination in a whole
body detector and changing back into normal clothes. Personnel are required to wear working
clothes inside the restricted area, and the employee uniform in the main building. When entering
and exiting the restricted area, they undergo similar procedures as those described for visitors.
The main difference would be the use of RFID badges to enter rather than signing in. With the
level of security for entering and exiting, taking WUM out of the restricted area in one's person
through the primary entrance is not a simple task.
In addition to the entering and exiting measures described above, other facilities are also
known to use additional procedures and strategies for personnel entering or exiting
accountability. For example, some facilities keep weight records prior to entering and compare
them to exiting weight (M. Golay, personal communication, February 18, 2009). Facilities that
use this strategy prohibit eating and drinking in the facility because of the hazards related to fuel
reprocessing. There are also no bathrooms within the facility, and personnel must use bathroom
facilities in the main building. Because of this, weight should in principle not change, although
bringing in tools and equipment for maintenance are likely handled differently in the entrance
procedures.
1.3 External Surveillance
There are cameras outside the facility that feed to a recording system that stores
information for about three months prior to being written over. There is a receptionist at the
entrance during regular business hours. The front door is locked at all times and requires either
an RFID badge or keys to enter. There are no metal detectors at the entrance to the main
building although visitors may be required to walk under one prior to a tour. During non-
business hours, only minimum staff is on site, and only cameras watch the entrance.
Every day, there are various routine security inspections done throughout the day to
verify that the facility has not been breached. These are done by personnel on site and by police
who visit every few hours. Personnel performing these security inspections verify that
emergency exits and fences have not been tampered with. A more rigorous security inspection is
done on a weekly basis to make sure that fuel-containing areas within the facility have not been
compromised. Cameras and the associated monitors and recording system are also checked for
signs of physical damage, while surveillance monitors are verified to be still capable of alarming
should there be any signs of tampering in the area. Police inspections consist of verifying that
any alarming condition related to a security breech does in fact send the proper signal to the
police department.
1.4 Inside the Facility
According to information regarding the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) as described
by Iwamoto et al. (2006), the inside of the facility is divided into five sections where all relevant
processes occur. The first section is where material is received and stored. This area contains a
large pool specifically designed to hold fuel in a particular configuration such that it prevents
criticality. Fuel in the pool is very radioactive and requires a well-shielded and heavy transfer
cask attached to a crane for movement. Also, there are various cameras and detectors around the
pool to guard the spent fuel as shown in Figure 1-3.
Figure 1-3. Spent fuel pool drawn to scale with crane moving across the pool. Camera surveillance
located above columns.
Iwamoto et al. (2006) describes the next section as the area where all the main processes
take place including the uranium conversion area. Processes in this area include fuel chopping,
dissolving, and aqueous separation. There is also an On-Site Laboratory (OSL) for inspections
that has the necessary equipment to perform tests on any stage of the reprocessing. Figure 1-4
shows the hot cells present in the OSL used by the IAEA inspectors. Wastes from the Main
Process Area end up in the Waste Treatment and Storage Area, while uranium and plutonium go
to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Conversion Area. The final product ultimately goes to the Product
Storage Area. In terms of surveillance, there are over 50 monitoring systems and 70 cameras
throughout the facility. These are primarily used by the IAEA and State inspectors, but can also
occasionally be used by facility operators (Iwamoto, Ebata, Fujimaki, & Ai, 2006).
Figure 1-4. The hot cells shown here are representative of those found in the laboratory for sampling
material. These hot cells have external arm manipulators to handle material inside. Image based on on-site
laboratory photo of the Rokkasho facility (Matsuo, 2008, p. 15)
1.5 Fuel Shipments
The reprocessing facility is designed to handle fuel from power plants around the country.
Nuclear fuel is received and dispatched in the form of fuel elements every two weeks. The fuel
is transported in an ordinary looking shipping truck with a few markings indicating that special
material is being handled. Additionally, the truck is accompanied by police vehicles while being
continuously monitored via a global positioning system (GPS) using satellites to verify its
location at all times. The truck driver is specially trained to deal with any problems that may
arise during the fuel shipment.
The arrival site is a truck lock leading to the shipment building. Here, a team of trained
employees verify the shipment by checking for the double seal on it as well as comparing its
contents to the shipment papers. The fuel is kept underwater in the transport cask until it is
moved into the spent fuel pool. The fuel is identified during the movement. The entire process
of receiving and moving the fuel is done by a qualified team following written procedures.
When new fuel is being dispatched, the fuel is placed in a shipping cask by the qualified
team. The reprocessing facility is responsible for the fuel accountability and shipment until the
shipment truck delivers it. The truck is again tracked using real-time GPS technology and
escorted by police until it reaches its destination. Additionally, the reprocessing facility
personnel monitor the shipment by contacting the delivery service provider. The shipper is not
trained to handle nuclear material and thus is not responsible for verifying the shipping cask
contents prior to departure from the reprocessing facility. The shipper is only accountable for
transporting the cask while leaving the contents intact. The actual fuel content is then verified
upon arriving at its new destination.
1.6 Conclusion
The reprocessing facility crafted above is intended as a representation of a real
reprocessing facility. The use of the various assembled sources to create a fictional reprocessing
facility is done as an example to determine weaknesses that a proliferator could potentially
exploit. The resulting description of the facility and its use is carefully conceived and believed
sufficiently accurate so that any exploitable weaknesses are minimized as would be the case in a
real reprocessing facility.
2 Chemical Process and Mechanical Systems
Fuel separation is done to extract useful material from spent fuel. One method known as
the aqueous process uses counter-current flow of two immiscible liquids, one aqueous and one
organic, to extract "tagged" material from the solution. The following explains the mechanical
process for decladding, the aqueous extraction process, and the components used in the
extraction.
2.1 Fuel Chopping and Decladding
Spent fuel comes in complex forms of various element shapes and sizes held together by
structural materials like zircaloy and aluminum. To take advantage of the aqueous process, spent
fuel needs to be presented in liquid form. This is achieved by chopping the fuel elements and
dissolving them in nitric acid. The nitric acid solution separates the fuel from the cladding
material and prepares the fuel for the aqueous extraction process as will be discussed in the
following section.
2.2 Aqueous Reprocessing
The extraction of materials is done through the careful manipulation of the wanted
element's oxidation state such that it travels through various stages while sequentially being
extracted from one liquid to the other through the use of contactors and immiscible liquids (Long,
1967, p. 163).
Figure 2-1 shows the main idea behind aqueous reprocessing. The decladding process
previously explained also changes the valence states of plutonium and uranium to ones that will
adequately interact with the aqueous process. This change of valence state acts as a tag for the
material to be extracted.
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Figure 2-1. The aqueous process here describes the flow and separation of material through the various
stages. This figure was based on another figure developed by Argonne National Laboratory (2006, p. 8).
Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) process, the (IV) and (VI) states are preferable.
ition of the nitrite ion both reduces Pu(VI) and oxidizes Pu(mI) to Pu(IV) as follows:
PuO2+2 + NO2- + 2H --+ Pu + NO3- + H20 (2.1)
6Pu+3 + 2NO2" + 8H+ -- 6Pu+4 + N2 + 4H120 (2.2)
Uranium also undergoes a similar reaction to convert to its preferential valence state. In
:e, the plutonium will be extracted using a solvent such as tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP)
1967, p. 172). The TBP behaves such that it "extracts uranyl and plutonyl nitrates by
disolvated complexes" as shown below (Long, 1967, p. 187):
UO2+2 + 2NO3- + 2TBPorg + UO2(NO 3)2-" 2TBPorg (2.3)
PuO +2+ 2NO3- + 2TBPorg + PuO2(NO3)2-- 2TBPorg (2.4)
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According to Benedict and Pigford (1957), in the PUREX process, fresh solvent along
with the dissolved fuel first enters the extraction stage. The TBP preferentially selects the U and
Pu because of the valence state while leaving behind a raffinate containing fission products. This
U and Pu stream then proceeds to the scrubbing stage where lingering fission products are
scrubbed off with a nitric acid solution and complexant and are then deposited into the raffinate.
Next, the "raffinate is evaporated to recover nitric acid" and reduce the volume of the waste (p.
320).
Long (1967) then explains that the next step involves stripping the plutonium from the
organic solvent. However, prior to stripping, it is necessary to destroy the nitrite ion so that it
will not interact with the process. The addition of sulfamate ion does this as shown below:
NH2SO3- + NO2- -- N2 + H 20 + SO4-2  (2.5)
Ferrous sulfamate is used because the ferrous ion reduces plutonium to the (III) valence
state so that it can properly interact. As the plutonium gets reduced, the ferrous ion gets oxidizes
as follows (p. 172):
Pu+4 + Fe+2--_ PU+3 + Fe+3  (2.6)
Continuing the flow of the U and Pu stream, the organic loaded solvent is contacted with
an aqueous nitric acid aqueous strip where U remains in the organic phase while the Pu enters
the product (Benedict & Pigford, 1957, p. 320).
The UREX process is similar to the PUREX process except for a few minor
modifications. The important difference is that the ultimate goal of the UREX process is to
retrieve U while containing the Pu within the raffinate, thus making it more proliferation-
resistant. Meanwhile, the PUREX process is primarily used to obtain Pu (M. Regalbuto,
personal communication, November 2008). The main modification to the PUREX process for U
extraction is the addition of a complexing agent to the scrub phase. This complexant prevents Pu
as well as Np from being extracted into the product (Thompson, Norato, Kessinger, Pierce,
Rudisill, & Johnson, 2002, p. 2)
2.3 Contactors
Contactors are used to separate the organic solvent from the aqueous solution by first
mixing the two phases and then allowing them to separate. This is done so that the two phases
interact thereby allowing the organic solvent to extract the appropriate species from the aqueous
solution. Three major types of contactors are typically used: pulse columns, mixer settlers, and
centrifugal contactors. These contactors fundamentally produce the same result, although the
method by which it is achieved is different.
A pulse column (See Figure 2-2) behaves very much like the liquid timer toys in which,
when turned upside down, colorful water flows downward as oil floats upward because of
density differences. In this application, however, the difference would be that oil and water are
not being used and the contactor is not turned over. Rather an organic solvent and aqueous
solution interact such that only certain materials are exchanged. According to Flagg, the column
contains materials such as sieves to provide a torturous path for the fluids that are flowing
through the column. The aqueous solution flows from the top down interacting with the feed
which enters from the center and the solvent which enters from the bottom. The liquids are
mixed and then separated as they flow through the pulsed column. Resulting is an organic
stream that flows out of the top of the column and an aqueous stream that is removed from the
bottom (Flagg, 1961).
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Figure 2-2. Pulse column above shows organic entering at the bottom, feed at the center, and aqueous at
the top. Streams produce a mixture flowing through a torturous path. Fluid then separates into aqueous at
the bottom and loaded organic at the top. Image based on image produced by Law (2008).
A mixer settler consists of two sections (See Figure 2-3). In the first section, the aqueous
and feed solution and the organic solvent are thoroughly mixed with an impeller. The mixture
then flows into another compartment where the solutions are allowed to separate by gravity. The
aqueous and the loaded organic phases are separated and streamed out from their separate
compartments (Law, 2008).
Centrifugal contactors work by insertion of aqueous solution, feed, and organic solvent
from outside the contactor. The streams are mixed with mixing paddles that force the flow into a
centrifugal bowl. The mixture then separates into a light phase of loaded organics drawn from
the center and the heavy phase of aqueous solution drawn from the outside. See Figure 2-4.
Organic Aqueous Aqueous
Feed
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Figure 2-3. Mixer-Settler above has two main compartments. In the first section, aqueous and organic are
mixed. The second section allows for material to separate by gravity. Image based on image produced by
Law (2008).
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Figure 2-4. Centrifugal contactor showing the inlet of the organic phase on the lower left and the aqueous
phase and feed in the lower right. Materials are mixed and then separated using centrifugal force. Loaded
organic phase exits through the center toward upper right and aqueous phase exits from the outside toward
the upper left. Image based on image produced by Law (2008).
3 Safeguards, Surveillance, and Detection
In many nuclear facilities, safeguards for protecting nuclear materials are imposed by the
IAEA. These safeguards provide strict material handling requirements as well as material
accounting regulations. Furthermore, the IAEA enforces these safeguards by conducting random
inspections of the facilities. These may include visiting the sites in addition to collecting records
of the facility's fuel shipments and operating history for later study offsite. Additionally, the
IAEA uses their own equipment such as cameras, recorders, and detectors for inspecting these
sites so as to prevent any unauthorized use of equipment.
For a reprocessing facility, the IAEA also attempts to impose safeguards that would
quickly detect the diversion of a significant quantity (SQ). By doing so, the ability for a
reprocessing facility to smuggle WUM is greatly reduced.
This concept works fine for small-scale reprocessing facilities because the IAEA does not
have much trouble ensuring the safe and in-spec operation. Because of the small volumes of fuel
being reprocessed, the IAEA does not face much difficulty in confirming that a SQ of WUM
does not go unaccounted for simply because an SQ is far greater than the allowed accountability
error margin.
On the other hand, for a large-scale reprocessing facility, the accountability error margin
would be greater than several SQs because of the large volumes of spent fuel being processed.
Thus, the proper accountability of WUM becomes resource-intensive requiring high precision,
high accuracy, and constant surveillance in order to be proliferation resistant. Until now, the
IAEA still has not been able to develop credible safeguards because of lack of experience and
understanding (Iwamoto, Ebata, Fujimaki, & Ai, 2006, p. 1). With this in mind, this chapter
discusses proposed safeguards guidelines and potential requirements as well as surveillance and
detection systems.
3.1 Determining Safeguards Requirements
Iwamoto et al. discusses methods developed with the help of IAEA and JNFL and used to
create their own safeguards requirements for the RRP. Between the years of 1988 and 1992,
LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) was developed as a multinational forum
that showed that "an effective safeguards approach could be implemented to a large scale
reprocessing plant while maintaining an efficient use of resources." The following is a list of the
LASCAR recommendations as described by Iwamoto et al.:
* High accurate measurement systems for the nuclear material accountancy
* Timeliness of verification by advanced nuclear material accountancy techniques
* Redundant and independent containment and surveillance systems
* Early consultations on facility characteristics especially early and continuing
design information verification
* Authentication of equipment and systems made available by operator
* On-site verification capabilities
* Data acquisition and transmission
* The on-going or needed research and development tasks (Iwamoto, Ebata,
Fujimaki, & Ai, 2006, p. 1).
Additionally, Appendix A in Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (1995) describes the use of material balance areas (MBAs) to section of the facility into
areas where inventories of items and amounts can be reliably taken. Key Measurement Points
(KMPs) are also useful for measuring flow at strategic locations throughout the facility. Both
Near-Real-Time Accountancy (NRTA) of material along with Containment and Surveillance
(C/S) of the material as it travels through the facility are necessary for maintaining safeguards
(U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assesment, 1995, pp. 114-115).
3.2 IAEA Surveillance and Detection Systems
Iwamoto et al. (2006) states that inspectors mostly use independent equipment, although
occasionally they must share facility equipment that is used by operators because of limitations
such as space and resources. Even though some sharing is unavoidable, great measures are taken
to prevent tampering with the data or systems. For example, operators require approval prior to
using shared equipment, signals are measured against reference standards, and C/S methods are
used. Inspectors obtain samples for safeguards purposes through the Automatic Sampling
Authenticated System (ASAS) using the Pneumatic Transfer Network (PTN) that connects
sampling stations throughout the facility to the OSL. The OSL is particularly useful to both the
IAEA and the State because it allows for timely and on-demand analysis by providing an area
where questionable results can be identified and more carefully studied (pp. 2-3).
To meet the proposed safeguards requirements from the previous section, the RRP is
divided into five major areas as described in section 1.3. These areas are where material
accountability is performed and they correspond to the MBAs as shown in Figure 3-1.
Johnson et al. (2001) further describes the Inventory Key Measurement Points (IKMPs) within
the MBAs as being defined according to the materials measured as well as the method with
which they are measured. Within MBA-1, there are two IKMPs, which are the spent fuel receipt
and storage area and the head-end area. MBA-2 consists of three IKMPs: nuclear material in the
main process area, nuclear material in the analytical area, and nuclear material in the uranium
conversion area. MBA-3 only has one IKMP being the nuclear material in the waste treatment
and storage area. MBA-4 also has only one being the nuclear material in the MOX conversion
area. MBA-5 has two IKMPs separately accounting for U0 3 and MOX product material in the
storage area. Additionally, Flow Key Measurement Points (FKMPs) and Other Strategic Points
(OSPs) are determined to verify flow between and within boundaries respectively (p. 3). The
following sections show the application of safeguards for the various MBAs shown as described
by Johnson et al. (2001).
MBA - 2
Main Process Area Including U Conversion and
MBA - Analytical Laboratory MBA - 5
4 a Spent Fuel- Product StorageReceipt and Storage
Head-End Area MBA-3 MBA- 4 Area
MOX ConversionWaste Treatment and Storage Area Area
Figure 3-1. MBA structure for material accountancy at RRP as shown by Iwamoto et al. (2006)
3.2.1 MBA-I: Spent Fuel Receipt and Storage Head-End Area
The spent fuel surveillance in MBA-1 begins after its arrival at the facility. The fuel is
transported in a cask to the spent fuel pool. In this process, the actual receipt of the fuel is
verified using the Integrated Spent Fuel Verification System (ISVS), which consists of "time
synchronized CCTV cameras and radiation detectors". The volume of dissolved fuel batches, or
Input Batches, that are to be transferred to the MBA-2 is determined with the Solution
Measurement and Monitoring System (SMMS). The uranium and plutonium are sampled using
the ASAS or Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (HKED). Left over solid waste such as the hulls and
cladding material are checked for traces of uranium and plutonium using the Hulls Monitoring
System (HMS), which then correlates the ratios of uranium and plutonium to those of 244Cm in
both the hulls and dissolver solutions. A Shipper/Receiver Differences (SRD) evaluation is then
performed on the nuclear material by balancing the Input Batches and the Head-End waste
produced against the shipping reactor's declarations.
While the ISVS continuously monitors the spent fuel pool, the Head-End Process is
checked on a monthly basis through Interim Inventory Verifications (IIV). SMMS, density
correlations, and ASAS samples are used during the IIV.
Flow within MBA-1, which encompasses the transferring of fuel elements to the fuel
chopper and subsequently the hulls to the storage, is monitored via the Integrated Head-End
Verification System (IHVS), which "consists of a number of Camera/Radiation Detectors (CRDs)
mounted in the cell walls, with additional CCTV units installed in the shear cell." The IHVS
both confirms and records the spent fuel assembly and hull drum IDs. As for the dissolved fuel,
it is monitored in the Head-End Process using SMMS.
Additionally, a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) is performed yearly to verify spent
fuel "using an Improved Cerenkov Viewing Device (ICVD)." Both samples and SMMS are used
to confirm when the Head-End Process is cleaned-out (Johnson, et al., 2001, pp. 4-5).
3.2.2 MBA-2: Main Process Area
In the processes in MBA-2, Input Batches transferred over from MBA-1 are once again
verified using SMMS for changes in inventory. The plutonium nitride batches that are to be sent
to MBA-4 undergo volume verification via SMMS as well as HKED analysis using an ASAS
sample. The uranyl nitrate that gets transferred to the conversion area within MBA-2 does not
become verified, although U03 does undergo Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) for verification
using the Uranium Bottle Verification System (UBVS) and C/S measures. High Active Liquid
Waste (HALW) batches being sent to MBA-3 also undergo SMMS and ASAS sample
verification. For this verification, plutonium is analyzed via a Pu-VI spectrophotometric method
and uranium via Isotope Dilution Mass Spectroscopy (IDMS). On the other end of the spectrum,
Low Active Solid Waste (LASW) also being sent to MBA-3 gets verified by the Waste Crate
Assay System (WCAS), a passive neutron counting system that measures Pu content.
IIV is also done on a monthly basis for MBA-2 in which all vessel volumes undergo
SMMS verification as well as random sampling. Estimates are determined for inventories that
cannot be measured using "established process design algorithms." NRTA methods are used to
perform interim evaluations of Material Unaccounted For (MUF).
As for flow within MBA-2, the facility's proper operation is ensured through solution
monitoring. The SMMS in this area consists of sensors to detect temperature and pressures, with
which solution levels and density can be determined, as well as "neutron sensors on the
extraction systems." Random samples are also taken and analyzed in the OSL throughout the
month. Additionally, NRTA methods are used to perform MUF evaluations every one or two
weeks.
The MBA-2 PIV is also done on a yearly basis consisting of SMMS analysis on
remaining solutions after clean-out. Additional random samples are also taken and studied at the
OSL (Johnson, et al., 2001, p. 5)
3.2.3 MBA-3: Waste Treatment and Storage Area
In terms of waste treatment within MBA-3, vitrified High Active Waste (HAW) must be
analyzed using the Vitrified Canister Assay System (VCAS) prior to its being released from
safeguards. VCAS functions much in the same way as the HMS in MBA-1 by using 244Cm
neutron emission detection to determine its content and then using the Pu:U:2 44 Cm ratio found
through samples from the feed material and meltor to determine indirectly the nuclear material
content. The neutron radiation data are then paired with cameras monitoring the measurement
station and verifying canister IDs.
The monthly IIV involves SMMS and ASAS sample verification of the liquid waste
inventories. Pu-VI spectrophotometric analyses are also done in the OSL. Solution monitoring
also confirms the flow within MBA-using SMMS verification of the HALW feed rate to the
meltor. Random HAWL samples are also taken to be studied using the VCAS. The yearly PIV
done during clean-out involves verifying the inventory in MBA-3 using SMMS and random
sample analyses (Johnson, et al., 2001, p. 6).
3.2.4 MBA-4: MOX Conversion Area
After PuN batches are transferred over from MBA-2, the material balance is again
verified using SMMS. Before Mixed Oxide (MOX) powder canisters can be sent to the MBA-5
storage areas, content verification must be done using a Plutonium Canister Assay System
(PCAS), which is "based on high level neutron coincidence counting and high resolution gamma
spectroscopy." Additionally, a PCAS camera records canister IDs while MOX powder samples
are taken for IDMS based destructive analysis. Waste being sent to MBA-3 undergoes Waste
Drum Assay System (WDAS) verification, "which is based on passive neutron multiplicity
counting and high resolution gamma spectroscopy."
The monthly IIV calls for SMMS verification and random sample HKED analysis of all
solutions with Pu. The Plutonium Inventory Measurement System (PIMS) verifies the
plutonium going into the MOX conversion lines by using a total neutron counting technique.
NRTA methods also check for MUF regularly. SMMS is again used to verify flow within MBA-
4, while PIMS monitors MOX powder flow in the conversion lines. During the yearly PIV
clean-out, PIMS is used to ensure the clean-out was properly done as well as to measure residual
material. SMMS and samples are used to study any leftover solution (Johnson, et al., 2001, pp.
6-7)
3.2.5 MBA-5: Product Storage Area
Neutron detectors and surveillance cameras ensure the arrival of MOX canisters in MBA-
5. The combination of cameras and detectors allow for the tracking of both filled and unfilled
MOX canisters moving from the PCAS station in MBA-4 to MBA-5. IIV strategies have not
been finalized although C/S, random sampling and measurements have been considered. PIV is
done yearly by comparing stored values to expected values based on previous counts and C/S
accounting methods (Johnson, et al., 2001, p. 7).
3.3 Material-Accountancy Challenges
Appendix A in Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (1995)
describes some of the difficulties in material-accountancy faced even after all the safeguards are
in place. This issue makes both detecting the existence or absence of a diversion a non-trivial
matter. The accurate accountancy of vast dissolved plutonium quantities is a particular concern.
One of the major difficulties involves error margins. The requirement is that MUF
should not exceed 8 kg (1 SQ) or 3.3 percent of the annual throughput, whichever is larger. This
requirement, thus, allows for several SQs of MUF in the error margins each year. To address
this limitation, the Running Book Inventory (RBI) method can be used. However, this method
works by subtracting the output Pu from the input Pu without considering the material in the
system. If the value is far less than a SQ, diversion is not considered. However, this could lead
to problems over a term longer than that for which the RBI method accounts. This then leads to
the use of NRTA paired with Adjusted Running Book Inventory (ARBI) using direct inventories
of material in the system. The use of NRTA and ARBI on a frequent basis leads to a reduced
uncertainty, allowing for the quicker detection of a diversion. However, to set up the NRTA
system appropriately, it needs to be calibrated using long term real data that has not been
affected by a diversion. Additionally, the NRTA system faces detection threshold limitations
that are in excess of a SQ. In other words, a sudden diversion of a SQ may not be detected by
NRTA (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assesment, 1995, pp. 117-120).
3.4 Conclusion
Although the use of safeguards helps reduce the risk of diversion, resource and
technological limitations inhibit the existence of fully diversion-proof large reprocessing
facilities. Nevertheless, safeguards do complicate any possible diversion of material.

4 Obtaining WUM within the Facility
One may wonder how sufficient material can be collected illicitly given safeguards,
detection systems, and other preventive obstacles. This chapter analyzes methods for collecting
WUM within the facility.
4.1 Diversion Methods
Data were obtained from a reprocessing facility performance simulation by examining
the elemental concentrations that would be present in flow streams of material reprocessed at a
typical aqueous reprocessing facility(Argonne National Laboratory, 2008). These data included
a nominal scenario with the normally expected concentrations in addition to three facility misuse
scenarios (see Appendix A - Sample Diversion Scenario Data). These simulated data consisted
of the different materials present at the end of the reprocessing streams and their concentration
without disclosure of how the facility's processes were altered. The study of these three
diversion scenarios describes the results that might be potentially achieved given conceivable
methods to divert WUM from a reprocessing facility.
Specific information such as the type of process used and the volumetric flow rates of the
streams were not given. Thus, several assumptions were made in this respect. The product and
raffinate stream concentrations indicate that a UREX process was used. In order to determine
the total mass processed for the various materials, the ratios of the flow rates for the different
streams were assumed to be those described by Thompson et al. (2002, p. 18) as shown in
The mass rate outputs were found for the nominal case using the concentrations, flow rate
ratios, and the molar masses. The feed and the scrub flow rates together account for the material
in the raffinate stream. The solvent flow rate determines the spent solvent stream mass rate,
while the strip flow rate correlates to the product stream mass rate. Table 5 in Appendix A -
Sample Diversion Scenario Data provides the results from these calculations.
Table 1.
Volumetric Flow Rates of Streams in Nominal Scenario
Stream Flow Rate [IJmin]
Solvent 0.0171
Scrub 0.00315
Feed 0.00459
Strip 0.00859
Note. Values describe flow rates through the various streams in the nominal scenario. Obtained from
Thompson et al. (2002, p. 18)
In order to calculate the mass output for the diversion cases, mass conservation equations
relating the fission products were used. Because the diversion scenarios are each unique, they
were independently analyzed in order to determine what adjustments had been made.
For the first diversion scenario, mass balance was achieved by comparing the UO 2 and
the Pu4 mass rates. These were chosen because the total mass rate should be conserved if neither
UO 2 nor Pu4 is being accumulated elsewhere. Only the raffinate and product stream
concentrations were considered because the spent solvent stream concentrations were over
twenty orders of magnitude smaller and thus not useful in solving a system of equations for three
unknowns. Thus, the spent solvent flow rate was considered to remain the same as in the
nominal case. In order to determine the new flow rates, the product and raffinate streams were
balanced independently using UO2 and Pu4 respectively because they have negligible impact on
each other. Table 2 shows the flow rate results from this calculation.
Use of these flow rates to determine the fission product mass rates indicated that they
were being conserved. Nonetheless, this scenario showed that there was more complexing agent
being added. It was also noted that the amount of Pu4 in the product and spent solvent are
marginally increased. It is important to recognize that an increase this small may be difficult to
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detect. Table 6 in Appendix A - Sample Diversion Scenario Data provides the results from these
calculations.
Table 2.
Volumetric Flow Rates of Streams in the First Diversion Scenario
Stream Flow Rate [ILmin]
Solvent 0.0171
Feed and Scrub 0.00837
Strip 1 0.0107
Note. Values describe flow rates through the various streams in the first diversion scenario. Values were
calculated using mass balance.
For the second diversion scenario, the same combination of U0 2 and Pu4 could not be
used for the mass balance because the Pu4 appeared to be removed from the streams. After
attempting to balance the Pu4 to determine the flow rates, the resulting mass rate outputs of the
other fission products were very different from the nominal case. Thus, Ba and UO2 were
chosen to be independently balanced because they were mainly concentrated in different streams.
Again, the spent solvent flow rate was considered to remain the same as in the nominal case
because of the negligible concentrations present. Table 3 shows the flow rate results from this
calculation.
Table 3.
Volumetric Flow Rates of Streams in the Second Diversion Scenario
Stream Flow Rate [L/min]
Solvent 0.0171
Feed and Scrub 0.00774
Strip 0.00859
Note. Values describe flow rates through the various streams in the second diversion scenario. Values were
calculated using mass balance.
The flow rates determined from this calculation showed that most fission products did
indeed balance. However, the major change is that most of the Pu 4 is removed from the raffinate
stream, and there is a noticeable increase of Pu4 in the product stream together with the U0 2.
This appears to be the result of greatly reducing the amount of the complexing agent. Neither the
Pu4 nor the other fission products balanced. It is possible that in this scenario, Pu 4 is being
accumulated in the system itself waiting for the proliferator to collect it during the next
maintenance shutdown. Table 7 in Appendix A - Sample Diversion Scenario Data provides the
results from these calculations.
For the third scenario, the solvent concentrations are large enough to be incorporated in
the mass balance, and thus U0 2, Pu4 , and TcO4 concentrations are used to determine the flow
rates. The U0 2 and Pu4 , concentrations were chosen for the same reasons as the mass balance in
the first diversion scenario, and the TcO4 concentration was chosen because it was largely
present in spent solvent stream. The raffinate flow rate was determined by independently
balancing the Pu4 against the nominal case. As for the product and spent solvent streams, there
is sufficient U0 2 and TcO 4 in both that a system of equations for two unknown needed to be
solved to determine their respective flow rates. Table 4 shows the flow rate results from this
calculation.
Table 4.
Volumetric Flow Rates of Streams in the Third Diversion Scenario
Stream Flow Rate [L/min]
Solvent 0.00266
Feed and Scrub 0.00774
Strip 0.00216
Note. Values describe flow rates through the various streams in the third diversion scenario. Values were
calculated using mass balance.
In this scenario, part of the U0 2 is being removed in the spent solvent stream and less is
going into the product stream. There is also a significant TcO4 and Pu4 increase in the spent
solvent. Perhaps the plot here is to remove the Pu4 in trace quantities from the spent solvent
stream during the solvent cleaning step. Table 8 in Appendix A - Sample Diversion Scenario
Data provides the results from these calculations.
4.2 Conclusion
The diversion methods described above are the main methods in which WUM can be
diverted. In the UREX process, WUM can be diverted to the product stream and taken with the
product, diverted to the spent solvent stream and collected during the solvent wash, accumulated
within the system until it is collected during the cleanout, or it can even be taken directly from
the raffinate stream. These methods of diversion, however, only address the issue of gathering
the material within the facility. Another part of the problem is to determine how to retrieve and
remove it from the facility successfully.

5 Diversion Scenario Success Tree Analysis
In order for a reprocessing facility to divert WUM while evading IAEA inspectors, a
careful plan must be devised that includes various methods that lead to success. This chapter
focuses on the development of diversion strategies for a UREX reprocessing facility and
organizes them into a success tree structure. The study is not intended to be an all encompassing
analysis, but rather to provide strategy examples and to lay grounds for further development.
5.1 Success Tree Methodology
In order to succeed at diverting material, there are two challenges that the facility needs
to overcome. The first is that material must be obtained within the facility. The second is that it
must be taken out of the facility. These two events can be further analyzed by studying the
various possible diversion paths. This systematic approach of studying the necessary events
leads to the success tree structure shown in Figure 5-1. Within the two main required events in
the success tree, the various paths available are cut off to be shown in following figures. The
following sections discuss the conceivable strategies to obtain material within the facility and the
various measures that need to be overcome in order to take the material out of the facility.
5.1.1 Obtaining Material within the Facility
There are three main routes for obtaining WUM within the facility: material may be
obtained as a trace contaminant of a different stream, sequestered in a control volume, or taken
directly from the raffinate stream.
Figure 5-1. Success tree structure shows strategies to divert WUM.
5.1.1.1 Obtaining Material as a Trace Contaminant
In order to obtain WUM as a trace contaminant as was discussed in the first and third
diversion scenarios in section 4.1, material needs to be rerouted to a different stream and then
collected (see Figure 5-2). The rerouting of plutonium can be achieved by varying the process
chemistry. The addition of extra complexant to the scrub leads to marginal increases of Pu4
content in the spent solvent and product streams. The agent can also be substituted by one that
behaves similarly to that used, except for pulling more Pu4 into the other streams. The organic
can also be changed or varied to produce a similar effect. The chemical process is described in
section 2.2 and by Figure 2-1.
The material then needs to be collected after being redirected to a different stream. If the
material is collected from the spent solvent stream, the spent solvent can be taken directly or the
Pu4 can be taken during the solvent washing step. If the material is taken from the product, it can
be collected as fuel bundles at the end of the process or it can be taken from the liquid product
directly.
Figure 5-2. Tree branch shows available paths to obtain WUM as a trace contaminant from either the spent
solvent or product streams by varying the chemistry in the process.
5.1.1.2 Sequestering Material within the Control Volume
In order to sequester Pu4 within the system as was described by the second diversion
scenario in section 4.1, the chemistry again needs to be altered (see Figure 5-3). In this case,
however, the complexant needs to reduced, withheld, or replaced by a different complexant to
force the Pu4 to remain in the contactors (see chemistry flow in Figure 2-1). It is also possible to
change the organic solvent to one that will not interact with Pu4 and thus leave it behind in the
system.
For material collection, the diverter must ensure that maintenance cleanouts are
performed before the material achieves a critical mass and collect it during the cleanouts.
Because cleanouts are normally scheduled to occur before much material would accumulate
under nominal conditions, the change in chemistry must be properly done such that the material
still does not accumulate at a rate faster than can be compensated for by the maintenance
cleanouts. Furthermore, IIV and other inventories are typically performed on a monthly basis
(see section 3.2). Methods to evade detection of these systems are discussed in future sections.
Figure 5-3. Tree branch shows available paths to obtain WUM by collecting the material within the system
by varying the chemistry in the process.
5.1.1.3 Obtaining Material Directly from the Raffinate Stream
Plutonium can be taken from the raffinate stream right after the extraction step (see
Figure 5-4). Nonetheless, this strategy is difficult because of the UREX process. The UREX
process is devised to be proliferation-resistant by mixing plutonium with other highly radioactive
fission products. Special arrangements are necessary to transport this highly radioactive material.
One possible tactic is to install extra piping during the facility's construction or during
maintenance. This external piping can lead to a hidden room built during construction for the
storage of diverted material. Either installed illicit piping or process piping can also be used to
fill drums with WUM directly. The material can also be taken from the batches as they travel
from MBA-2 to MBA-3, although this requires substituting with dummy batches in order to not
be discovered immediately. Any dummy batches used in this strategy must necessarily behave
as
Take directly
from raffinate
Take during
Use external MBA-2 to Take from
piping tMBA-3 transfer processpiping
Take from Replace
batch with dummy
transfers batch
Figure 5-4. Tree branch shows available paths to obtain WUM by taking it directly from the raffinate
stream.
5.1.2 Taking Material out of the Facility
After WUM is collected within the facility, there is still another problem to solve. Both
the detector and surveillance systems need to be defeated in order to take WUM successfully out
of the facility. This can be achieved by creating a distracting incident such as a fire or a
criticality accident. Such strategies may provide enough distraction to lower security such that
the removal goes unnoticed. This method, however, would not allow for multiple incidents to
occur, and the proliferator would need to take out all the material they have acquired at once or
in a few steps. Independent detector and surveillance systems can also be targeted to prolong the
time in which material can be removed.
5.1.2.1 Defeating the Detector Systems
There are four additional methods that can defeat the detector systems (see Figure 5-5).
The first is a power failure of both external power and the backup power generator. A power
failure would disrupt any detector systems that are not battery-equipped. Detectors with backup
batteries can be targeted by methods such as improperly testing battery life or shorting the
batteries. The second is to disrupt the detector system and cause a recorder failure. This can be
done by breaking the mechanism that prints or the one that feeds the paper. Such failure can
easily be an 'accidental' failure if the cause is improper paper or ink replacement. Other
recorder systems such as those using magnetic technology can be targeted with strong magnets to
erase data. The third method is that the detector itself can fail. This can happen if the signal is
below the sensitivity tolerance and could work for the minor complexant changes that result in
minute concentration differences. Overwhelming the detector with an external signal that
prevents the detector from producing useful data is a potential technique that can also be used to
cause a detector failure. The detector may also simply fail because of overtime wear and become
Out Of Commission (OOC). The last method is that the detector system can be defeated if
WUM is replaced with a dummy or material that produces similar radiation and chemical
signatures and compensates for the lost mass as well.
Each of the three methods of diverting material described in section 5.1.1 would require
defeating various detector systems in the different areas as described in section 3.2. Additionally,
redundant systems of different detector types are typically used to monitor each station. The
proliferator needs to strategically target each individual detector with methods that cause a
common failure in order to avoid raising suspicion.
Figure 5-5. Tree branch shows potential strategies to defeat detector systems.
5.1.2.2 Defeating the Surveillance System
In order to defeat the surveillance system, cameras and entrance detectors both need to be
defeated (see Figure 5-6). Described below are various strategies that can help to achieve this.
Defeating the camera system can include simply knowing where all the cameras are
located and avoiding their paths. This perhaps may be impossible because the cameras are likely
directed at areas being guarded. There is, however, the possibility that the operator can change
the camera viewing range such that another person taking material out would not be recorded on
the system. This strategy requires synchronized acting of the camera operator and the person
taking the material.
Another method can involve causing the cameras to fail. This can be done by aiming the
light of a strong laser at the lens. However, if the functionality of the cameras is checked
regularly, this approach may be too risky because it would be obvious that the cameras had been
subject to tampering.
The camera system can also be targeted where the data are stored. If this is a computer, a
virus could take care of it, but this might also raise suspicion. Perhaps an even better method
would be to wipe out the hard drive by using a strong magnet or similar tactic. In such an event,
IAEA inspectors cannot blame the facility for the camera surveillance failure because the facility
can easily claim that the hard drive has simply gone bad and needs replacement.
The defeat of the entrance detectors is another tricky business. There are three exits that
can be used for taking the material out of the reprocessing building. These include the main exit,
the shipment exit, and the emergency exit.
Material can be taken out through the regular exit. The use of this exit requires defeating
both the weight and the contamination detectors. The weight detector is the one described in
section 1.2 in which weight of personnel entering the facility is compared to their exiting weight.
Two possible ways to deal with this challenge are to simply turn it off or to carry something of
equal mass in and leave it behind. The contamination detector could also be defeated by turning
it off or changing the tolerance. However, if logs are kept for the readings of these detectors,
other approaches need to be considered.
If the shipment exit is used, material can be taken out as part of a shipment. Such a
shipment would need to be either a real or fake shipment. In a real shipment, the WUM would
accompany the rest of the shipment. A fake shipment would be a shipment devised to ship out
legitimate material in paperwork only and not in reality. The use of the shipment exit poses
problems such as inspectors being extra cautious for shipments.
Figure 5-6. Tree branch shows potential strategies to defeat surveillance systems.
The emergency exit can be used during a real or created emergency, but inspectors will
likely be waiting outside helping other employees out of the building. Alarms and security
systems enabled on the doors could also be disabled. If the disarmament goes unnoticed, the
door would remain unmonitored until it is tested on security checks.
5.2 Other Considerations
The strategies analyzed in the last section involve the evasion of onsite detection. Other
considerations that were not included in this analysis, but which are also important for a
successful diversion, include evading offsite detection. This can include detection of various
conditions of the facility by analyzing particulate exhaust using externally located detectors or
airplanes collecting samples as well as heat production using satellites imaging.

6 Conclusion
By fabricating a hypothetical UREX reprocessing facility, describing the chemical
process, and studying how material is processed, safeguarded, and moved within the facility, a
success tree for the diversion of WUM was created. The diversion success tree was developed
by considering both the preventive measures that need to be overcome in order to succeed and
the many pathways that can be used to achieve this. Analysis of the various diversion strategies
using this structure allowed for the exposure of the various complexities and potential
weaknesses involved in the diversion of WUM. The success tree, although not all-inclusive,
allows for the comprehension of how such kinds of diversions can be carried out. Although not
included in this study, the success tree can further be used to calculate the probability of success
for minimal path sets if probabilities are obtained for the individual events. These probabilities
need to be obtained from reliable and credible sources such as government institutes that conduct
these types of studies.
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Appendix A - Sample Diversion Scenario Data
Table 5.
Nominal Scenario for UREX Fuel Reprocessing
Molar Spent Spent Mass
Mass Raffinate Product Solvent Raffinate Product Solvent Rate
(g/mol) Moles Mass Rate (g/min) (/min)
Ag 107.87 1.55E-04 2.08E-24 6.55E-52 1.29E-04 1.93E-24 1.21E-51 0.0001
Agen 75t0 155E 01 193E " 03 4. .3- 7 • 30 1E3 2E 0.91
Am 243.00 5.72E-04 9.13E-24 1.63E-49 1.08E-03 1.91E-23 6.77E-49 0.0011
Cd 112.41 1.68E-04 2.26E-24 7.11E-52 1.46E-04 2.18E-24 1.37E-51 0.0001
Cm 247.00 2.79E-05 4.45E-25 7.94E-51 5.33E-05 9.45E-25 3.35E-50 5E-05
C 3 .. 2 'r8E5 647 3 1 -50 .0.0 4.
Eu 151.96 1.89E-04 3.02E-24 5.38E-50 2.22E-04 3.94E-24 1.40E-49 0.0002
OKI .' 10 O.. 0.017
Gd 157.25 1.74E-04 2.77E-24 4.94E-50 2.11E-04 3.74E-24 1.33E-49 0.0002
Nd 144.24 6.04E-03 9.64E-23 1.72E-48 6.74E-03 1.19E-22 4.24E-48 0.0067
N04 -.5E-57 3. 6.28E-4 33' 0.0004
NpO2 269.00 2.22E-04 6.68E-24 2.73E-52 4.62E-04 1.54E-23 1.26E-51 0.0005
Pm 145.00 1.81E-05 2.90E-25 5.16E-51 2.03E-05 3.61E-25 1.28E-50 2E-05
Pu_4 976.00 7.43E-03 1.05E-19 4.59E-45 5.61E-02 8.76E-19 7.66E-44 0.0561
. 5 .83E...4 .7E ~ .44E 0.000d .. M-1 . ... ,... .....
Rh 102.91 9.88E-04 1.32E-23 4.18E-51 7.87E-04 1.17E-23 7.35E-51 0.0008
RN 1 4 E. 5E2 I #. 4.5E-03 19.8E23 4 7.7 46
Sm 150.36 1.20E-03 1.92E-23 3.41E-49 1.40E-03 2.47E-23 8.78E-49 0.0014
TcO4 162.10 .84E-0R 9..E-23 3 1 E-56 1 1R.8E-04 1.17E-23 7. 7E-51 0.0001
-23 3.08E-49 I 7.44E-04 1.32E-23 4.68E-49 1 0.0007
Note. The calculated ratios were based on values provided in "Demonstration of the UREX Solvent
Extraction Process with Dresden Reactor Fuel"(p. 18). The following stream volume flow rates in L/min
were used: solvent 0.0171, scrub 0.00315, feed 0.00459, strip 0.00859. The total mass was 0.442 grams in
one minute.
Table 6.
First Diversion Scenario for UREX Fuel Reprocessing
Molar Spent Spent Mass
Mass Raffinate Product Solvent Raffinate Product Solvent Rate
(/mol) Moles Mass Rate (g/min) (g/min)
107 R7 1.92E-24 1.29E-04 2.23E-24 1.12E-51 0.0001
Am 243.00 5.29E-04 8.95E-23 1.62E-48 1.08E-03 2.34E-22 6.74E-48 0.0011W9m g,; 7 0"A A r ....9- FI .
Cd 112.41 1.56E-04 2.09E-24 6.57E-52 1.46E-04 2.52E-24 1.26E-51 0.0001
Cm 247.00 2.58E-05 4.37E-24 7.91E-50 5.33E-05 1.16E-23 3.34E-49 0.0001
Eu 151.96 1.75E-04 2.96E-23 5.36E-49 2.22E-04 4.83E-23 1.39E-48 0.0002
Gd 157.25 1.60E-04 2.72E-23 4.92E-49 2.11E-04 4.59E-23 1.32E-48 0.0002
Nd 144.24 5.58E-03 9.45E-22 1.71E-47 6.74E-03 1.46E-21 4.22E-47 0.0067
NpO2 269.00 2.05E-04 5.94E-23 2.19E-51 4.62E-04 1.71E-22 1.01E-50 0.0005
Pm 145.00 1.68E-05 2.84E-24 5.14E-50 2.03E-05 4.42E-24 1.27E-49 0.0000
Pu_4 976.00 6.87E-03 3.87E-18 6.49E-44 5.61E-02 4.05E-17 1.08E-42 0.0561
Rh 102.91 9.14E-04 1.23E-23 3.86E-51 7.87E-04 1.35E-23 6.80E-51 0.0008
Sm 150.36 1.11E-03 1.88E-22 3.40E-48 1.40E-03 3.03E-22 8.74E-48 0.0014
TcO4 162.00 4.36E-08 2.01E-04 1.15E-26 5.91E-08 3.50E-04 3.17E-26 0.0004
Y 88.91 1.00E-03 1.69E-22 3.07E-48 7.44E-04 1.62E-22 4.66E-48 0.0007
Note. The calculated ratios were derived based on nominal data and mass balance. The following stream
volume flow rates in L/min were used: solvent 0.0171, feed and scrub 0.008371, strip 0.0107. The total
mass was 0.465 grams in one minute.
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Table 7.
Second Diversion Scenario for UREX Fuel Reprocessing
Molar Spent Spent Mass
Mass Raffinate Product Solvent Raffinate Product Solvent Rate
(g/mol) Moles Mass (g/min) (g/min)
Am 243.00 5.72E-04 8.83E-24 1.57E-49 1.08E-03 1.84E-23 6.51E-49 0.0011
B 19 3 859,4 27 5 050030
Cd 112.41 1.68E-04 2.26E-24 7.11E-52 1.46E-04 2.18E-24 1.37E-51 0.0001
Cm 247.00 2.79E-05 4.30E-25 7.64E-51 5.33E-05 9.13E-25 3.23E-50 0.0001
Eu 151.96 1.89E-04 2.92E-24 5.18E-50 2.22E-04 3.81E-24 1.34E-49 0.0002
F,19.00 1.-S5 4 4 4 0 1680 2 .7E.50 000
Gd 157.25 1.74E-04 2.68E-24 4.75E-50 2.11E-04 3.62E-24 1.28E-49 0.0002
Nd 144.24 6.04E-03 9.32E-23 1.65E-48 6.74E-03 1.15E-22 4.08E-48 0.0067
N02 269.00 2.22E-04 5.17E-24 2.12E-52 4.62E-04 1.20E-23 9.73E-52 0.0005
Pm 145.00 1.81E-05 2.80E-25 4.96E-51 2.03E-05 3.48E-25 1.23E-50 0.0000
Pu 4 976.00 1.55E-19 1.10E-03 7.98E-29 1.17E-18 9.23E-03 1.33E-27 0.0092
Rh 102.91 9.88E-04 1.32E-23 4.18E-51 7.87E-04 1.17E-23 7.35E-51 0.0008
Sm 150.36 1.20E-03 1.85E-23 3.28E-5049 1.40E-03 2.39E-23 .44E-49 0.0014
Sm 150.36 1.20E-03 1.85E-23 3.28E-49 1.40E-03 2.39E-23 8.44E-49 0.0014
RRQ 1 1 ORF-01 1 67P--91 9 0 I 7.44E-04 1.27E-23 4.50E-49 I 0.0007
Note. The calculated ratios were derived based on nominal data and mass balance. The following stream
volume flow rates in LImin were used: solvent 0 .0171, feed and scrub 0.00774, strip 0.00859. The total
mass was 0.304 grams in one minute.
Table 8.
Third Diversion Scenario for UREX Fuel Reprocessing
Molar Spent Spent Mass
Mass Raffinate Product Solvent Raffinate Product Solvent Rate
(g/mol) Moles Mass Rate (g/min) (g/min)
Ag 107.87 1.55E-04 8.27E-24 5.88E-46 1.29E-04 1.92E-24 1.69E-46 0.0001
Am 243.00 5.72E-04 3.62E-23 2.55E-44 1.08E-03 1.90E-23 1.65E-44 0.0011
Cd 112.41 1.68E-04 8.98E-24 6.38E-46 1.46E-04 2.18E-24 1.91E-46 0.0001
Cm 247.00 2.79E-05 1.77E-24 1.25E-45 5.33E-05 9.41E-25 8.19E-46 0.0001
Eu 151.96 1.89E-04 1.20E-23 8.44E-45 2.22E-04 3.92E-24 3.42E-45 0.0002
Gd 157.25 1.74E-04 1.10E-23 7.75E-45 2.11E-04 3.73E-24 3.24E-45 0.0002
Nd 144.24 6.04E-03 3.82E-22 2.70E-43 6.74E-03 1.19E-22 1.04E-43 0.0067
NpO2 269.00 2.22E-04 2.65E-23 7.83E-44 4.62E-04 1.54E-23 5.61E-44 0.0005
Pm 145.00 1.81E-05 1.15E-24 8.10E-46 2.03E-05 3.59E-25 3.13E-46 0.0000
Pu 4 976.00 7.43E-03 3.53E-19 4.40E-20 5.61E-02 7.44E-19 1.14E-19 0.0561
Rh 102.91 9.88E-04 5.27E-23 3.75E-45 7.87E-04 1.17E-23 1.03E-45 0.0008
Sm 150.36 1.20E-03 7.59E-23 5.36E-44 1.40E-03 2.46E-23 2.14E-44 0.0014
TcO4 162.00 5.92E-08 6.71E-04 2.68E-04 7.42E-08 2.35E-04 1.16E-04 0.0004
Y 88.91 1.08E-03 6.85E-23 4.83E-44 7.44E-04 1.31E-23 1.14E-44 0.0007
Note. The calculated ratios were derived based on nominal data and mass balance. The following stream
volume flow rate ratios were used: solvent 0.00266, feed and scrub 0.00774, strip 0.00216. The total mass
was 0.442 grams in one minute.
